Hastings Law Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 3

Article 13

1-1964

Hearsay under the Administrative Procedure Act
Stephen D. Natcher

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Stephen D. Natcher, Hearsay under the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 Hastings L.J. 369 (1964).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol15/iss3/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

Feb., 1964]

NOTES

quirement" 33 The difficulty is that not infrequently legislation is procured
by special interest groups to further their own interests rather than the public
interest.34 As this legislation accumulates, the right and liberty of the indi35
vidual to work in a chosen occupation becomes increasingly curtailed.
Admonishing one who has been deprived of his occupational license to resort
to the polls rather than the courts for protection against legislative abuses
may well lead him to conclude
that his right to work and earn a living does
36
not enjoy a very high status.
Roger Kensil*
33219 A.C.A. at 584, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 354, quoting from Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
34 See Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts, 27 IND. L.J. 38 (1951);
Duane Lockard (a Connecticut state senator), The Tribulations of a State Senator, Tim
REPORT
May 17, 1956, pp. 24-27.
3
5See GET.T oRN, INDIVIDuAL FREEDom AND GovENmNmml.A RE STATs 105
(1956); Hanft & Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17
N.C.L. BEv. 1 (1938).
30 This is a reference to the famous quotation from Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
134 (1876): "For protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must resort to
the polls, not to the courts," quoted in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488,
and in the Doyle case, 219 A.C.A. at 584, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
* Member, Second Year Class.

HEARSAY UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
An extrajudicial statement offered in court to prove the truth of the
matter asserted constitutes hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence in judicial proceedings unless subject to one of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule. The exclusionary hearsay rule is based upon the lack of opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the extrajudicial declarant, and is
designed to safeguard the jury from being misled by incompetent evidence.,
Exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay are based on the presence of some
safeguard which will insure the veracity and accuracy of the proffered testimony despite the absence of the adversary's right to cross-examine. 2 In
proceedings before administrative agencies this safeguard takes the form of
the expertise which each agency develops in its particular field, thereby
becoming less likely to be misled by untrustworthy evidence.3 For this
reason, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act 4 and similar state enact' McCo cr, EvmENcE 459 (1954); 5 WicmoRiE, EviDENCE § 1361 (3d ed. 1940).
2

See 5-6 WiGMoiE EvmENCE §§ 1420-764 (3d ed. 1940), for an exhaustive compilation and discussion of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. See also, McConmxcr,
EVIDENCE 480-625 (1954); WrrmN, CALIFoRNIA EVIDENCE §§246-309 (1958).
3

Davis, Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HA.v. L. Rv. 364, 371-416

(1941).
4 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11. This statute provides for rule making
power, adjudication power, and judicial review. The evidence provision of the act appears in 5 U.S.C. § 1006(c):
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but every agency shall
as a matter of policy provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or un-
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ments 5 allow the liberal admission of hearsay in administrative proceedings.
In California the rule of liberal admissibility in administrative proceedings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act is embodied in
section 11513(c) of the Government Code. The only restriction on admissibility is that the evidence be relevant and of the sort "on which responsible
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs."7 Unlike
provisions in many states, however, section 11513(c) expressly provides that
hearsay which does not come within one of the recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding.8 This limitation
on the sufficiency of hearsay came into California law prior to the enactment
of section 11513(c) 9 in the case of Walker v. City of San Gabriel'0 No witnesses were called to testify; the only evidence offered to support the city
duly repetitious evidence and no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be
issued except upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof
as may be cited by any party and as supported by and in accordance with the
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. ...
See 2 DAviS, ADuM SRA'=Tr LAW § 14.08 (1959).
5 See, e.g., KANSAs GEN. STAT. 44-523 (1949) (technical rules of procedure do not
apply); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A § 11(2) (1959) (agencies covered need not
observe the rules of evidence required by the courts); N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6515(5)
(liberality in admitting hearsay in suspension of license proceedings); OHio 1Ev. CODE
ANN.tit. 1, § 119.09 (Anderson 1953) (same). But see N.D. 1Ev. CODE § 28-32-06
(1960) (rules of evidence in civil courts applicable in administrative proceedings).
6 The hearing need not be conducted according to technical rules relating to
evidence and witnesses. Any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort
of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct
of serious affairs, regardless of any common law or statutory rule which might
make improper the admission of such evidence in civil actions. Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining any direct
evidence but shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would
be admissible over objection in civil actions.
CAL. GOV. CODE § 11513(C).
CAL. GoV. CODE § 11501(b) lists more than fifty agencies directly subject to the
Act; also there are some fifty other agencies made subject to the Act by statutes in their
respective Codes. See OFFIcE OF ADMn'ISTaATVE PRocEDUrE, THE ADMINISTRATVE
PRocnua AcT 23-25 (1963), and Bobby, An Introduction to Practice and Procedure
Under the California Administrative ProcedureAct, 15 HASmums L.J. n.4 (1964)
(supra this issue).
7
CAL. GoV.CODE § 11513(c). The proposition that hearsay is admissible has been
well settled by the courts: Moyer v. State Bd. of Equalization, 140 Cal. App. 2d 651,
295 P.2d 583 (1956) (hearsay testimony identifying bartender); Mast v. State Bd. of
Optometry, 139 Cal. App. 2d 78, 293 P.2d 148 (1956) (affidavit); Dyer v. Watson, 121
Cal. App. 2d 84, 262 P.2d 873 (1953) (testimony as to what was said to prospective
renters by persons at the property as to its occupancy admissible); Manning v. Watson,
108 Cal. App. 2d 705, 239 P.2d 688 (1952) (judgment of conviction in federal court);
Stuck v. Board of Medical Examiners, 94 Cal. App. 2d 751, 211 P.2d 389 (1949) (narration of conversation between doctor and patient when doctor referred patient to an
unlicensed person for an abortion).
8 Apparently New York has a similar provision with regard to the sufficiency of hearsay evidence stated expressly in the code. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6515(5).
9Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 867 § 1, p. 1626.
10 20 Cal. 2d 879, 129 P.2d 349, 142 A.L.R. 1383 (1942).
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council's revocation of respondent's license to conduct an auto wrecking
business was a letter from the police chief enumerating violations of city

ordinances. The California Supreme Court held that for the board to revoke
the license on the basis of hearsay alone was an abuse of discretion.
The clear prohibition of the statute was most recently given effect in

1 The court
Sunseri v. Board of Medical Examiners."
reversed on five of six
counts sustained by the board:

There is no direct evidence of appellant's participation in the events
charged in counts A, B, C, D, and E. Since respondents finding and order as
to counts A, B, C, and D rests on hearsay evidence only and count E is without any support in the evidence, its order as to these counts cannot be sustained.12

This express language of section 11513(c) creates a limitation in administrative proceedings not found in civil actions. In a civil action if admissible
hearsay is not objected to it can of itself support a finding,13 while in administrative proceedings hearsay is limited to supplementing direct evidence,'1
and no right is given to object on the sole ground that the evidence is
hearsay.1 5 The reason for this difference becomes apparent when the parties
to the actions are considered. Parties in a civil action generally are represented by counsel and are therefore charged with the responsibility of knowing the rules of evidence. Failure to object is considered a waiver of the
rule. In administrative proceedings, respondents generally are not represented by counsel.16 To hold such parties to knowledge of the technical
rules of evidence and to the penalty of waiver for failure to make a timely
and specific objection would be unfair to them.
Although the district court of appeal in 1952 clearly pointed out this
-1224A.C.A. 413, 36 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1964). Dr. Sunseri was found by the board
to have violated section 2399.5 of the California Business and Professions Code on six
counts. He filed a petition for mandamus under CAL. CODE Cry. Pnoc. § 1094.5.
12 Id, at 421, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 558.
is I WG ton, EvENCE § 18 (3d ed. 1940) states as a general rule that failure
to object to incompetent evidence or failure to appear is a waiver of objection to its
competency and the evidence may be of probative force. For a California rule holding
that hearsay admitted without objection is sufficient to support a finding or judgment
see the following cases: Powers v. Board of Public Works, 216 Cal. 546, 15 P.2d 156
(1932); Estate of Ballard, 210 Cal. App. 2d 799, 26 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1962). See also
Annot., 79 A.L.R. 2d 890 (1961); Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1130 (1936).
14 CAL. GoV. CODE § 11513(c).
15 Nowhere in the Act is there provision for objection to hearsay evidence; however, such a privilege is given by the hearing officer, probably as a carry-over from civil
actions, and to aid in exclusion of irrelevant evidence. Interview with Jerome P. Herst,
Hearing Officer in Charge of San Francisco Office, October 5, 1963.
36 See TmrH BrENNmr REPORT, JUDICIAL CouNciL OF CALIFBo-NlA&21-23 (1944)
for a discussion of the then proposed section 11513(c). The council relied on the fact
that it would unduly penalize a respondent, appearing without counsel, to adhere to
the exclusionary rules of the common law. The council also pointed out that these proceedings were civil and not criminal in nature. This proposition has been well settled
by the courts: Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal. 2d 534, 110 P.2d 992
(1941); United Liquors, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 218 A.C.A.
474, 32 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1963).
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distinction between civil actions and administrative proceedings, 17 peripheral
language in at least two subsequent cases shows that some confusion has
existed. In the often cited case of Swegle v. State Board of Equalization,",
Justice Dooling emphasized in a concurring opinion that in his view the
decision did not extend the consequences of failure to object in a civil action
to hearings before administrative boards or hearing officers. However, the
court in discussing the introduction of hearsay testimony by a police officer
said that counsel for the respondent should have either made an objection
to each offer of hearsay, clearly stating that the objection would run to the
entire line of testimony, or made a motion to strike at its conclusion. In the
subsequent case of Griswold v. Departmentof Alcoholic Beverage Control,0
the court in upholding the suspension of respondent's liquor license stated
that if no objection were offered, it was waived and the objectionable evidence would be considered in support of a finding.20 The court found that
no objection was made when the hearsay evidence was presented in the
hearing, but that the evidence was relevant and strongly supported other
direct evidence. The case in fact follows section 11513(c), although language of the opinion reflects confusion as to the role of objections to admission of hearsay evidence in administrative proceedings.
In spite of the confusing language of these cases, the recent case of
Bendetti v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control2' appears to state
most clearly what Swegle and Griswold did not. In Bendetti the court held
that since hearsay was admissible under section 11513(c), there could be
no effective objection interposed. Therefore, the court concluded, hearsay
evidence admitted under section 11513(c) could only be used to supplement
direct evidence, whether objected to or not
Stephen D. Natcher*
3. Marlo v. Board of Medical Examiners, 112 Cal. App. 2d 276, 246 P.2d 69 (1952).
18 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 270 P.2d 518 (1954). Swegle had allegedly been lax in
conducting her on-sale establishment by allowing fights, intoxicated persons, and soliciting prostitutes on the premises.
39 141 Cal. App. 2d 807, 297 P.2d 762 (1956).
Here the court was reviewing the
suspension of respondent's liquor license for serving liquor to a minor. Respondent appeared by counsel who did not object to the introduction of hearsay evidence.
20 The court actually cited a civil action case for this proposition, Merchant Shippers Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 28 Cal. 2d 594, 170 P.2d 923 (1946).
Id. at 811, 297 P.2d 764.
21 187 Cal. App. 2d 213, 9 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1960). Respondent appealed from a
revocation of his liquor license for keeping a disorderly house, disturbing the neighborhood, and allowing sexual perverts on his premises.
* Member, Second Year Class.

